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In environmental conflicts where private citizens sue a 
polluter, a private citizen’s participation in the fight for 
environmental damages is characterized by the public good 
nature. We examine how the introduction of collective litigation 
and asymmetric reimbursement rule affects each citizen's choice 
between free-riding and participation in the collective litigation. 
Following a Stackelberg model, we assume that citizens move 
first and the firm follows, while each citizen has to state his 
environmental damages to the court in the process. Important 
findings are as follows: First, in the individual litigation, the 
hungriest citizen who most highly values environmental damages 
is the only one to participate. Second, in the collective litigation, 
all citizens participate, provided the total damages of the 
citizens' group are sufficiently larger than the damages of the 
hungriest citizen. Third, under certain conditions, introduction of 
the asymmetric reimbursement rule enhances the possibility that 
all citizens participate in the collective litigation.
Keywords: Collective litigation, Environmental conflicts, 
Individual litigation, Public goods, Asymmetric 
reimbursement
JEL Classification: Q0
* Research Fellow, Gyeonggi Research Institute, 179 Pajang-dong 
Jangan-gu, Suwon, Gyeonggi-do 440-290, Korea, (Tel) +82-31-250-3552,  
(E-mail) shpark123@gri.re.kr; Professor, Department of Economics, Korea 
University, Jochiwon-eup, Yeongi-gun, Chungnam 339-700, Korea, (Tel) 
+82-41-860-1514, (E-mail) lmh@korea.ac.kr, respectively.
[Seoul Journal of Economics 2007, Vol. 20, No. 3]
SEOUL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS284
I. Introduction
Traditionally, the theory of environmental conflicts has examined 
the efficiency consequences of a citizen (or a representative of private 
citizens) and a firm competing over a private good.1 In the real 
world, however, there are naturally more than one citizens who 
suffer from environmental damages while valuing the environmental 
damages in different magnitudes.
Baik (1993) and Baik et al. (2001) studied contests in which a 
number of groups compete with each other to win a group-specific 
public-good prize. They showed that only the hungriest player, who 
values the prize most dearly, of each group participates in the 
contest. Building on Baik (1993), Park and Shogren (2003) applied 
this concept of public-good prize to the environmental conflicts for 
the first time. Park and Shogren (2003) also analyzed, for the first 
time in the literature, whether the practice of asymmetric 
reimbursement rule can induce the less-hungry citizens to 
participate in the environmental conflicts. Under the asymmetric 
rule, the firm has to reimburse the citizens' legal expenditures while 
not being reciprocated in kind by the losing citizens.2 
Baik (1993), Baik et al. (2001), and Park and Shogren (2003) 
assumed that all relevant information is common knowledge and that 
each player in every group tries to maximize his own expected payoff 
in the individual litigation.
Our research is different from the said three papers on account of 
the following.
First, we consider the Stackelberg equilibrium, in lieu of the 
Cournot equilibrium obtained in the previous papers, as a solution 
concept. In the Stackelberg model, each citizen first reveals his 
environmental damages to the court, that is, the citizens move first 
and the firm follows.3 Accordingly, information on the size of 
1 See, for example, Baik and Shogren (1994), Heyes (1997), Hurley and 
Shogren (1997), Katz et al. (1990), Park and Lee (2007a), and Park and Lee 
(2007b). 
2
In this vein, the rule is perceived as an asymmetric modification of the 
classic British loser-pays system.
3
Hurley and Shogren (1997) and Heyes (1997) emphasized that, in the 
real-world environmental conflicts, plaintiffs move first and defendants follow. 
Heyes (1997, p. 412) states that “under civil and criminal law the moving 
party states its case first, the defendant (in this case the polluting firm) then 
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damages become common knowledge.4 It is because each citizen in 
the citizens' group has to inform the court of his environmental 
damages, and thus both all citizens and the firm get to know the 
environmental damages of each citizen as well as the total damages 
of the citizens' group.
Second, unlike the previous papers that stopped at proving the 
existence of free-riding, we proceed to examine on what conditions 
the citizens prefer participating in the collective litigation to 
free-riding.
Third, for the first time in the literature, we consider the 
asymmetric reimbursement rule as a device to promote citizens' 
participation in the collective litigation. The U.S. federal government 
attempted to promote public participation in the environmental 
conflicts by embodying the asymmetric rule in such laws as Clean 
Air Act, Clean Water Act, and Endangered Species Act. In this case, 
the citizens' suits are perceived not as a replacement of the 
legislative process but as “a means of providing realistic access to 
legislatures so that the theoretical processes of democracy can be 
made to work more effectively in practice” (Sax 1970).5  
The following section develops the framework of analysis in the 
paper. Section III solves for the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium 
(SPNE) in the individual litigation (IL, hereafter). In Section IV, the 
SPNE in the collective litigation (CL, hereafter) are derived 
considering, respectively, the no-reimbursement rule (NR, hereafter) 
and the asymmetric reimbursement rule (AR, hereafter). Finally, in 
Section V, we analyze the equilibrium consequences of IL and CL 
and offer our concluding remarks.
II. The Framework of the Analysis
Consider contests in which a citizens' group attempts to win 
environmental damages by expending observable and irreversible 
effort against a polluting firm. The group consists of I risk-neutral 
citizens. Let us define x
i
c as the irreversible effort level spent by 
citizen i(＝1, 2,…, I) in the group. Let Xc be the total effort level, or 
chooses whether and how vigorously to defend itself.”  
4
See Hurley and Shogren (1997, pp. 257-8).
5 Also see Naysnerski and Tietenberg (1992), Settle et al. (2001), and 
Shavell (1982).
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the summation of all citizens' effort levels in the group, i.e., Xc＝
∑Ii=1x
i
c. Let us define xf as the irreversible effort level spent by the 
firm. The firm is assumed risk-neutral.  
Let pc(Xc, xf) be the probability that the citizens' group wins the 
damages as shown in Baik and Shogren (1994) and Park and 
Shogren (2003). Likewise, let pf(Xc, xf ) be the probability that the 
firm wins the suit. The contest itself is modeled as a “lottery 
auction.” In case both Xc and xf are zero, it turns out that pc(0, 0)＝
pf(0, 0)＝1/2. Otherwise, the probability-of-winning functions for the 
group and the firm are expressed as pc＝Xc/(Xc＋xf ) and pf＝xf/(Xc＋
xf ), respectively.
Valuations for the environmental damages may differ across the 
individual citizens in the group. Before going to trial, each citizen in 
the group has to reveal his environmental damages to the court. 
Thus, all citizens' damages are publicized in the process. Let v
i
c 
represent the valuation of citizen i's damages such that6
                               vic＝Vc.
If the citizens' group wins Vc, the losing firm must pay Vc to the 
group while citizen i in the group receives v
i
c. 
Let us now assume as follows:
Assumption 1: vc
h－1＞vhc＞0   (h＝2, 3,…, I).
Following the Stackelberg equilibrium as a solution concept, we 
also assume that the citizens in the group first choose their effort 
levels and then, after observing the citizens' effort levels, the firm 
chooses its effort level.  
In IL, each citizen chooses his effort level independently. In CL, 
however, all citizens jointly choose the total effort level for the group.
III. SPNE in the Individual Litigation
Baik (1993) used the Cournot model to prove that only the 
hungriest player participates in the environmental conflicts. We 
follow the same proof procedures as in Baik (1993) and investigate 
whether the identical result is obtainable by using the Stackelberg 
6
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model.
In IL, the expected payoff of citizen i and the expected loss of the 
firm are, respectively, as follows:
πic＝pc(v ic－x ic)＋(1－pc)(－xic)




c                                  (1)
                  L f＝pc(Vc＋xf )＋(1－pc)(xf )  
   ＝pcVc＋xf                                  (2)
Consider the firm's reaction to the group's action. We first 
minimize the firm's expected loss over its effort level. Let x f̃ denote 
the best response of the firm. The first-order condition for this 
problem is:
∂Lf/∂xf＝－XcVc/(Xc＋x f̃)
2＋1＝0,    for x f̃＞0            (3)
or
∂Lf/∂xf＝－XcVc/(Xc＋x f̃)
2＋1≥0,    for x f̃＝0            (4)
Equation (3) implies that its marginal gross loss {XcVc/(Xc＋x ̃f )2} 
must equal its marginal cost, 1, as the firm expends a positive effort 
level. Equation (4) implies that its marginal gross loss must not 
exceed its marginal cost as it chooses zero effort. The firm's expected 
loss function is strictly convex in its effort level. That is, a unique 
solution exists for the firm's minimization problem.
We derive the firm's reaction function, Rf (Xc), for the case of a 
positive effort level, by solving Equation (3) above.
Rf (Xc)＝－Xc＋(XcVc)
1/2                       (5)  
Next, given the other citizens' effort levels, citizen i selects x
i
c to 
maximize his expected payoff subject to the firm's reaction function, 
Rf (Xc).
                    max πic＝pcvic－x ic
s.t. Rf (Xc)＝－Xc＋(XcVc)
1/2                    (6)
Let x ̃ic  denote the best response of citizen i. The first-order 
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condition is:
∂πic/∂x ic＝v ic/2(XcVc)1/2－1＝0,    for x ̃ic＞0            (7)
or
∂πic/∂x ic＝v ic/2(XcVc)1/2－1≤0,    for x ̃ic＝0            (8)




1/2} must equal his marginal cost, 1, as he expends a 
positive effort level. Equation (8) implies that his marginal gross 
payoff must not exceed his marginal cost as he chooses zero effort. 
Citizen i's expected payoff function is strictly concave in his effort 
level. That is, a unique solution exists for citizen i's maximization 
problem.
Using Equations (7) and (8), we obtain Lemma 1.   
Lemma 1: In IL, {x̃c
h－1≥x ̃ch } holds, for h＝2,…, I.
Proof: Equations (7) and (8) show that each citizen's marginal cost 




1/2} is monotonously decreasing in the effort 









h－1＞0} holds, then {x c̃
h－1＞x c̃
h} should hold. And, if 
{x c̃
h－1＝0} holds, then {x ̃ch＝0} should hold.    
Using Lemma 1, we derive SPNE in IL. Let xc
i* and Xc
* denote, 
respectively, the effort level of citizen i and the group's total effort 
level, at equilibrium. Lemma 2 summarizes our results.
Lemma 2: At SPNE in IL, the total effort level of the citizens' group 
equals the effort level of the hungriest citizen, who most highly values 





1*}. Then, by Lemma 1, {Xc
*＞xc
1*≥xc
h*} holds for 
h＝2,…, I. Thus, {xc
1*≥xc
h*} should hold. Consider {xc
1*＞xc
h*＞0}. 





1/2－1＜0}. Therefore, by Equation 
(8), {xc
h*＝0} should hold, which contradicts {xc
h*＞xc
h*＞0}. This results 
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in the following two findings: (a) {xc
1*＞0} implies {xc





i*} holds in SPNE. 
By combining (a) and (b) above, we find that {Xc
*＝xc
1*≥0} holds in 
SPNE.
Using Equations (5) and (7), we obtain SPNE in IL as in 
Proposition 1.
Proposition 1: At SPNE in IL, equilibrium solutions are as follows: 
The effort level of citizen 1: xc
1*＝(vc
1)2/4Vc
The effort level of citizen h: xc
h*
＝0, for h＝2,…, I




The combined effort level of all litigants (citizens and the firm): T*＝vc
1
/2





The expected payoff for citizen 1: πc1*＝(vc1)2/4Vc
The expected payoff for citizen h: πch*＝vc1vch/2Vc , for h＝2,…, I







IV. SPNE in the Collective Litigation
In Section IV, we first consider CL-NR and then move onto CL-AR. 
Our CL models are characterized as follows: (i) the citizens' group is 
treated as a single entity competing with the firm to win Vc; (ii) the 
total effort level of the citizens' group is allocated to each citizen in 
accordance with the proportion of his damages, i.e., {(vc
i/Vv)Xc＝xc
i }; 
and (iii) in CL-AR, the losing firm has to reimburse the citizens for 
their legal expenditures.
If citizen i's expected payoff in CL exceeds that in IL, he prefers 
participating in the collective litigation. If this prevails for all citizens, 
then free-riding vanishes. 
A. Collective Litigation with No-Reimbursement
Let us consider the case of CL-NR. The total expected payoff for 
the citizens' group is: 
π̄c＝   (pcvci－xci )＝pcVc－Xc                   (9)
The expected loss of the firm in CL-NR is equivalent to that in IL 
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solution requires that the group selects Xc to maximize the total 
expected payoff subject to the firm's reaction function, Rf (Xc)＝－Xc＋
(XcVc)
1/2.
                   max π̄c＝pcVc－Xc
s.t. Rf (Xc)＝－Xc＋(XcVc)
1/2                    (10)
Let X̑c denote the best response of the citizens' group. The first- 
order condition for this problem is: 
∂π̄c/∂Xc＝Vc/2(XcVc)1/2－1＝0,    for X̑c＞0            (11)
or
∂π̄c/∂Xc＝Vc/2(XcVc)1/2－1≤0,    for X̑c＝0            (12)
The total expected payoff function is strictly concave in the group's 
total effort level. That is, a unique solution exists for the group's 
maximization problem.
We assume, as described earlier, that citizen i's effort level is 
determined in accordance with the sharing rule {(vc
i/Vv)Xc＝xc
i }. Using 
Equations (5), (11), and (12), we obtain SPNE as the citizens' group 
chooses a positive value for Xc̑. The following proposition summarizes 
the results.
Proposition 2: At SPNE in CL-NR, equilibrium solutions are as follows: 
The effort level of citizen i: xc
i**＝vc
i/4, for i＝1, 2,…, I
The total effort level of the citizens' group: Xc
**＝Vc/4
The effort level of the firm: xf
**＝Vc/4
The combined effort level of all litigants: T**＝Vc/2







The expected payoff for citizen i: πci**＝vci/4, for i＝1, 2,…, I
The expected loss of the firm: Lf
**＝3Vc/4 
B. Collective Litigation with Asymmetric Reimbursement
We now consider the case of CL-AR. The goal of AR is to promote 
citizen suits by reducing the financial risks of these “private attorney 
generals” by repaying their costs for discovery, investigation, court 
costs, and support staff if they win (Baik and Shogren 1994). 
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Let us consider the reimbursement ratio β, while assuming {0＜β＜1}.7 
In case the citizens' group wins the environmental damages, the firm 
has to reimburse βXc while citizen i receives βxci. 
The total expected payoff for the group now becomes: 
π̄c＝   (pc(vci＋βxci )－xci )＝pc(Vc＋βXc )－Xc            (13)     
The expected loss of the firm is expressed as:
Lf＝pc(Vc＋βXc )－xf                      (14)
The firm minimizes its expected loss. Assuming that the firm 
spends a non-zero effort level, standard calculation gives the 
first-order condition {－Xc(Vc＋βXc )/(Xc＋x ̃f )2＋1＝0}. The second-order 
condition is found met. By solving this equation we derive the firm's 
reaction function, Rf (Xc ). 
Rf (Xc )＝－Xc＋(Xc(Vc＋βXc ))1/2                 (15) 
Subject to Rf (Xc ), the citizens' group now selects Xc  to maximize 
the group's total expected payoff. 
                max π̄c＝pc(Vc＋βXc )－Xc
s.t. Rf (Xc)＝－Xc＋(Xc(Vc＋βXc ))1/2                (16)
Let X̌c denote the best response of the citizens' group. The first- 
order condition for this problem is:
∂π̄c/∂Xc＝(Vc＋2βXc)/2(Xc(Vc＋βXc))1/2－1＝0,    for Xč＞0     (17)
or
∂π̄c/∂Xc＝(Vc＋2βXc)/2(Xc(Vc＋βXc))1/2－1≤0,    for Xč＝0     (18)
The total expected payoff function is strictly concave in the group's 
7
“If β＝0, the model collapses to Tullock (1980)'s traditional model of a 
rent-seeking contest where reimbursement is nonexistent. As β approaches 
unity, reparations approach complete reimbursement of effort.” See Baik and 
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total effort level. That is, a unique solution exists for the group's 
maximization problem.
As in IV-A, we assume that citizen i's effort level is determined in 
accordance with the sharing rule {(vc
i/Vv)Xc＝xc
i }. Using Equations 
(13), (14), (15), and (16), we obtain SPNE as the citizens' group 
chooses a positive value for X ̌c. The following proposition summarizes 
the results.
Proposition 3: At SPNE in CL-AR, equilibrium solutions are as follows: 
The effort level of citizen i: xc
i***＝(1－√1－β )vci/2β√1－β , for i＝1, 2,…, I
The total effort level of the citizens' group: X c
***
＝(1－√1－β )Vc/2β√1－β
The effort level of the firm: x f
***＝(1－√1－β)Vc/2β
The combined effort level of all litigants: T***＝Vc/2√1－β




The expected payoff for citizen i: πci***＝(1－√1－β)vci/2β, for i＝1, 2,…, I
The expected loss of the firm: L f
***＝(－1＋2β＋√1－β)Vc/2β√1－β 
V. Discussion and Conclusion
Employing the Stackelberg model, we assumed that each citizen 
first reveals his environmental damages to the court and the firm 
follows. As evident in Proposition 1 for IL, we arrived at the same 
conclusion as with the Cournot model of the previous studies. That 
is, citizens' participation in the conflicts is characterized by the 
public good nature while free-riding prevails except for the hungriest 
player. This phenomenon, due to the assumption {Vc＞vc
1}, gives rise 
to the result that the citizens' group is the underdog with less than 
50% chance of winning the suit.8
Comparing Proposition 1 with Proposition 2, we observe the 
following. First, due to the assumption {Vc＞vc
1}, the expected payoff 
for citizen 1 in CL-NR {πc1**＝vc1/4} surpasses that in IL {πc1*＝
(vc
1
)2/4Vc}. Second, with the proviso that {Vc＞2vc
1
} holds, the 
expected payoff for the other citizens in CL-NR {πch**＝vch/4} is larger 
than that in IL {πch*＝vc1vch/2Vc}.
Lemma 3 summarizes the above results.
Lemma 3: In CL-NR, (i) the citizen who most suffers from the 
8 Define the favourite as the player with greater than a 50% of winning and 
the underdog as the player with less than a 50% of winning (Dixit 1987).
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environmental damages always prefers CL-NR to IL. (ii) the other 
citizens participate in CL, if {Vc＞2vc
1
} holds. (iii) The citizens' 
probability of winning is 1/2, if {Vc＞2vc
1} holds. In short, if {Vc＞2vc
1} 
holds, CL-NR encourages all citizens to participate in the collective 
litigation while fixing the citizens' probability of winning at 1/2.
Lemma 3 indicates that, as the collective litigation is instituted, all 
citizens are to participate in the environmental conflicts with the 
proviso that the total damages of the citizens' group are sufficiently 
larger than the damages of the hungriest citizen. 
Let us now compare Propositions 1, 2, and 3 with each other, to 
obtain the following implications. 
First, the expected payoff of citizen 1 in CL-AR {πc1***＝(1－√1－β) 
vc
1/2β } is always larger than that in CL-NR {πc1**＝vc1/4} and that in 
IL {πc1*＝(vc1)2/4Vc}. 
Second, if {Vc＞βvc1/(1－√1－β)} holds, due to the assumption 
{0＜β＜1}, the other citizens' expected payoff in CL-AR is larger than 
that in CL-NR and that in IL. This is because citizen h's expected 
payoff in CL-AR {πch***＝(1－√1－β)vch/2β } is larger (i) than that in 
CL-NR {πch**＝vch/4}, if {0＜β＜1} holds; and (ii) than that in IL {πch*＝
vc
1vc
h/2Vc}, if {Vc＞/βvc1/(1－√1－β)} holds.
Third, the aforementioned condition {Vc＞/βvc1/(1－√1－β)} develops 
to be satisfied as β approaches unity. It is due to the assumption 
{Vc＞vc
1} and the consideration of {lim(βvc1/(1－√1－β))＝vc1}. 
Consequently, as β approaches unity, all citizens in the group come 
to prefer CL-AR to CL-NR and IL. That is, as β approaches unity, 
employment of AR succeeds in persuading all citizens from 
free-riding to participation in the collective litigation.  




1/(1＋√1－β)} is higher than that in CL-NR {pc**(Xc**, xf**)＝1/2}, which 










1} holds and thus all citizens participate in CL, the 
combined effort level of all litigants in CL-AR {T ***＝Vc/2√1－β } is 
larger than that in CL-NR {T
**＝Vc/2}, which is larger than that in IL 
{T *＝vc
1/2}.
The contribution of this paper lies, most importantly, in providing 
policy implications with regard to AR. Before AR is incorporated, 
satisfaction of {Vc＞2vc
1} is a prerequisite for all citizens to participate 
in the collective litigation. Once AR is coupled with collective 
litigation, however, citizens' incentives are markedly strengthened to 
β→1
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eschew free-riding and to pursue litigation. As the reimbursement 
ratio (β) approaches unity, AR comes to recruit all citizens to the 
collective litigation with no more provisory clauses, while keeping the 
group's probability of winning above the levels attainable with IL or 
CL-NR.
(Received 22 March 2007; Revised 15 August 2007)
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